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ABSTRACT 
 
Using a dataset detailing FDI flows from market economies to transition economies we 
examine two aspects FDI inflow determinants given insufficient prior attention: labour 
costs and institutional development. We find low unit labour costs and aggregate 
institutional development enhance FDI receipts. Examining disaggregated development 
indicators identifies specific institutions that positively influence FDI: private sector 
development, banking sector reform, price, foreign exchange and trade liberalisation, 
and legal development. Conversely we find non-bank financial sector development and 
competition policy do not enhance FDI. Our analysis highlights that Russian FDI receipts 
have suffered from a gap between extensiveness and effectiveness of legal reform.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The particular institutional structure of a country profoundly influences the operation and 
performance of its economy (North, 1990; Scott, 1995; Di Maggio and Powell, 1991). For 
example, the structure of trade unions influences the operation of labour markets (Hirsch 
and Addison, 1986; for the structure of capital markets influences investment and 
growth, see Lucas, 1993; and for the legal arrangements underpinning an economy 
influences its growth and developments see La Porta et al. 1999. Thus, institutions are 
crucial for the operation of a market economy and facilitate business operations (Clague, 
1997; Harriss et al., 1997). However the interactions between national economic 
institutions and enterprise level organisational strategies are seriously under-researched. 
This is especially true in emerging markets, even though institutional arrangements are 
of particular significance because underlying the market mechanisms are typically weak 
and underdeveloped. Thus Hoskisson, Eden, Lau and Wright have argued that, in 
emerging markets, institutional theory should be “preeminent in helping explain impacts 
on enterprise strategies” (2000: 252). In this paper, we explore empirically the 
interactions between organisation strategy and institutional arrangements in the context 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are emerging markets in terms of their level 
of development and economic infrastructure (EBRD, 1999) but have formed a very 
distinct business environment, which derives from the transition from socialist planning to 
the market economy. These features may be retained for many years in the future 
(Meyer, 2001). As a result, western business strategies and organisational concepts can 
only be transferred to a limited extent and the approach to market entry observed in 
transition economies will differ from those in developed ones. 
 
Our approach is to incorporate the impact of institutional arrangements into the OLI 
framework (Dunning, 1993). Institutions can be viewed as providing important locational 
advantages and influencing the interactions between ownership and locational variables. 
Our methodology allows us to pinpoint the impact of specific elements of the institutional 
framework on foreign direct investment. We also contribute to the literature by including 
institutions that relate source and host countries, thereby reducing transaction costs. 
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Resources in the home country can be seen as a source of competitive advantages that 
facilitates business, even when the institutions of the host country are underdeveloped.  
 
Our work is primarily empirical, and seeks to relate, in the context of a well-specified 
model, FDI receipts in the transition economies with institutional development. The 
existing empirical literature has captured the impact of institutional development on FDI 
by either using aggregate indices (Brenton et al., 1999; Resmini, 2000) or perceived 
economic risk (Edwards, 1991; Wheely and Mody, 1992).1 We employ a wide variety of 
alternative measures. We find that institutional development at an aggregate level does 
enhance FDI receipts in transition economies. Examining subsets of institutional 
development, we can identify specific institutions that positively influence FDI receipts: 
private sector development, reform of the banking sector, price, foreign exchange and 
trade liberalisation, and legal development. By contrast we find that the development of 
the financial sector outside the banking sector and competition policy do not enhance 
FDI in our sample.  
 
This paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we outline literature and develop 
hypotheses which we test in our empirical analysis. Section 3 considers the interaction of 
ownership and locational advantages and develops hypotheses as to the effect of labour 
costs, distance and market size. Our empirical approach and results are outlined in 
section 4, in which we firstly examine the influence of aggregate institutional 
development, before disaggregating to consider a subset of institutional factors. Section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. INSTITUTIONS AS LOCATIONAL ADVANTAGES 
 
FDI is usually analysed on the basis of Dunning’s OLI paradigm, which sees FDI as an 
outcome of ownership advantages (O) of the firm combining with locational advantages 
(L) at a foreign location and internalisation incentives (I) favouring a hierarchical 
organisation over a market transaction. Our study focuses on two aspects of the OLI 
paradigm: the interaction between O-advantages and L-advantages at the national level, 
and on institutions as a subset of L-advantages of a host location. The institutional 
                                                 
1 Other scholars analyze specific institutional aspects in isolation, for instance the production of intellectual property 
rights (Oxley, 1999; Smarsnaska, 1999). The problem with this approach is that various aspects of the institutional 
framework tend to be correlated. 
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framework is a crucial L-advantage, in addition to factor endowments. To understand 
business strategies in emerging markets, it is therefore necessary to analyse investment 
decisions in different institutional contexts (Hoskisson et al., 2000). 
 
Many scholars employ North’s (1990) concept of institutions as “the rules of the game in 
a society”. More precisely, North (1990: 3) defined institutions as “the humanly devised 
constraints that structure human interaction” which include formal rules (laws, 
regulations) and informal constraints (conventions, norms). Similarly, Scott (1995: 33) 
defined institutions as “cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behaviour”. Institutional theorists have 
demonstrated the strong influence that institutional environments exert on organisations 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) and their strategic choices in 
particular (Child, 1972, 1997; Oliver, 1997; Peng, 2000). For firms contemplating foreign 
investment, the restrictions and incentives created by national and multilateral institutions 
“shift the playing field favouring some deals and opportunities while disadvantaging 
others. They force the investing firms to think strategically about how to avoid the limits 
imposed by domestic laws as well as how to reap the benefits that the law and particular 
circumstances are capable of providing” (Spar, 2001). 
 
Institutions are also the outcome of social and political processes, in which international 
businesses play a part (Spar, 2001). The policy areas of particular concern to 
multinational enterprises are trade policy, foreign investment rules, regulation, and anti-
trust and competition policies. Trade and FDI policies (and capital controls, where still 
used) are generally designed to explicitly influence international business, and are 
generally subject to international negotiations between governments and businesses. 
Other institutions, such as regulatory and competition policy are developed by the 
domestic political agenda. International businesses have to adapt to a variety regimes 
that, even if pursuing similar objectives, may apply radically different rules. This requires 
adaptation to different formalities when interacting with authorities, and, what is more 
challenging, different patterns of competition as a consequence of regulation. 
Sometimes, changes in competition policy can provide dramatic opportunity for 
competitive advantage for foreign investors as it may change the relative 
competitiveness of firms operating within a given market (Spar, 2001).  
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2.1 Business Strategies and Institutions in Transition 
Efficient markets depend on supporting institutions that can provide the formal and 
informal rules of the game of a market economy. Institutions lead to a fall in both 
transaction and information costs by reducing uncertainty and establishing a therefore 
stable structure to facilitate interactions (North, 1990). The absence of institutions 
represent a serious problem for business, especially in transition economies with their 
heritage of a socialist system. With the dissolution of the planning system, it was 
administrators who became independent economic agents. They acted on markets that 
existed only in rudimentary form; they lacked both the (tacit) knowledge on how to use 
the market mechanism and the market knowledge about potential products, partners, 
competitors and market demand. Thus, agents have had to engage in considerable 
search processes to establish transactions and to set prices, which generates high 
transaction costs (TCs) of establishing new business relationships and inhibits potential 
transactions (Swaan, 1997b; Meyer, 2001). As market-based institutions have become 
established in the transition economies (EBRD, 1999), these high TCs have been 
reduced, but not eliminated. Indications of this are the persistent high level of barter 
(Commander and Mumssen, 1999; Seabright, 2000) and informal networking (Ledeneva, 
1999; Puffer et al., 2000) in some countries of the former Soviet Union. Direct investors 
also, have to adapt their strategies to the local institutions (Oxley, 1999; Peng, 2000). 
Western businesses entering the transition economies therefore face high TCs in various 
markets as well as within organisations. As we have seen, these costs are higher than in 
mature market economies with a developed institutional framework because the 
transition temporarily creates an incomplete institutional framework. 
 
Foreign entrants can thus face particularly high costs in establishing an operation in 
transition countries. They lack information about their partners, and face unclear 
regulatory frameworks, an inexperienced bureaucracy, an underdeveloped court system, 
and corruption (Thornton and Mikheeva, 1996). All of this increases their search, 
negotiation and enforcement costs. Moreover they become entangled in the privatisation 
process. Until recently, this was the main mechanism for acquisition, but required 
complex negotiations with governmental authorities, management and work councils 
(Antal-Mokos, 1998; Carlin et al., 1995). After the acquisition, post-socialist firms need 
considerable investment in enterprise restructuring and major changes in corporate 
strategy, organisational structure and culture (Meyer and Møller, 1998; Uhlenbruck and 
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De Castro, 2000), which makes them “qualitatively different” from industry-specific 
deregulation in the west (Newman, 2001). In many cases the acquisition needs such 
deep restructuring that it almost resembles a greenfield, and thus is frequently referred to 
as brownfield (Meyer and Estrin, 1999). On the other hand, greenfield investment may 
be too slow to achieve the desired strategic objectives, notably if firms pursue first-
mover. They too face considerable establishment costs, as local bureaucracies are slow, 
for example in approving acquisition of real estate. 
 
Thus we can hypothesise that the creation of institutions for a market economy which is 
associated with progress in transition is crucial to attract FDI, by reducing the 
transactions costs of setting up a local operation. 
 
Proposition 1: “Progress in economic transition increases FDI inflows”  
 
Empirical research on the impact of host country institutions on foreign direct investment 
has demonstrated that the general institutional, social and legal framework influences 
FDI. Most research uses very aggregate indices and finds that lower risk and more 
market friendly institutions do increase FDI inflow. Nigh (1985), Schneider and Frey 
(1985), Edwards (1991) and Wheeler and Mody (1992) show the relevance of political 
variables, but their quantitative impact on FDI was minor compared to economic 
variables. Jun and Singh (1996) find that both ‘political risk’ and ‘operations risk’ (based 
on indices provided by Business Environment Risk Intelligence) significantly discourage 
FDI. A number of studies moreover used indicators of specific institutions, which — if 
used in isolation — act as a proxy for the whole institutional framework. For example, 
Jun and Singh (1996) and Barrel and Pain (1997) find that ‘work days lost due to 
industrial strikes’ has a negative impact on FDI. 
 
Studying bilateral FDI from western to eastern Europe, Brenton et al. (1999) include an 
economic freedom index, that was found to be positively related to FDI flows. Yet this 
index was highly correlated with per capita GDP, such that its interpretation is 
ambiguous. Resmini (2000) uses the same ‘operation risk index’ as Jun and Singh 
(1996) and finds that risk discourages FDI in some industries notably in scale intensive 
and high technology sectors. 
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The variation of institutional frameworks in eastern Europe is usually characterised by 
the countries’ progress in transition. We use an aggregate of the EBRD transition 
indicators to reflect general progress in transition. The index has been constructed as an 
average of eight key transition indicators reported by the EBRD in their Transition 
Report, reflecting progress in: small and large-scale enterprise privatisation; governance 
and enterprise restructuring; price liberalisation; trade and foreign exchange 
liberalisation; competition policy; banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, and 
reform of securities markets and non-bank financial institutions. Each of these individual 
EBRD indices are reported on a 1 to 4+ scale with higher numbers indicating greater 
reform progress. Such an index has also been used by Garibaldi et al. (1999) who find 
few significant effects on volume of FDI inflow to CEE though they include other 
institutional variables simultaneously, and by Meyer (2000a) who finds that progress in 
transition favours FDI over other forms of business. 
 
 2.2 Focus on Institutions: Which Ones Matter? 
While there is strong support for the proposition that institutions matter when it comes to 
attracting inward investors, there is little agreement as to which institutions are crucial, 
and which secondary institutions are merely correlated with them. To provide policy 
advice, we need to provide evidence on the relative importance of different institutions. 
The following propositions aim at shedding more light on which institutions in particular 
affect FDI inflows. We extend the previous literature by looking at the constituent 
elements of the institutional framework and suggesting specific propositions. Our 
empirical work focuses on their explanatory power, relative to both the aggregate index 
and to each other.  
 
  2.2.1 Privatisation 
Possibly the most important institutional change in transition is the change of ownership 
(Estrin, 1994; World Bank, 1996). State-owned firms are privatised on a large scale, 
while a small incipient entrepreneurial sector gradually gains market shares. Both forms 
of privatisation create opportunities for foreign investors in multiple ways: 
• private firms are more adept partners for Western businesses, lowering 
transaction costs; 
• private ownership encourages entrepreneurship and thus reinforces the 
competitive character of local markets, and 
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• privatisation itself creates opportunities for acquisitions and joint 
ventures. 
 
Therefore, we expect that all forms of privatisation and private sector development have 
a positive impact on inward investment: 
 
Proposition 2a:  “Progress in privatisation increases FDI inflows” 
 
Privatisation has numerous elements in transition economies and to reflect this, we 
include a variety of proxies of privatisation in our analysis. In prior research, Lansbury et 
al. (1996) find that private sector share has a positive effect on inward FDI in Visegrad 
countries, though this result is not confirmed by Holland and Pain (1998) using a larger 
set of host countries. In our work, we use the following variables to proxy for progress in 
privatisation: 
 
• EBRD index of large-scale privatisation 
• EBRD index small-scale privatisation 
• Private sector share in GDP. 
 
all of which are derived from the EBRD Transition Report (1999).  
 
Many transition countries chose to privatise by the free distribution of shares to 
managers, workers or the population as a whole so-called “mass privatisation” (Estrin, 
1994). For those that did not, the sale of enterprises can lead to significant FDI capital 
inflows as the purchasing price has to be transferred unless all funds are raised locally. 
Countries that chose to sell more enterprises to foreign investors should therefore be 
receiving more FDI. Holland and Pain (1998) find that the method of privatisation, 
measured on a four-point scale accelerates FDI inflows. We include their index in our 
analysis:2 
 
                                                 
2 The Holland and Pain (1999) index has a scale from 1 (primary privatization method, vouchers) to 4 (privatization 
method, sale to outsiders). A score of 2 goes to countries whose primary method is voucher but secondary method is 
sale to outsiders, and 3 if sale to outsiders is a primary method while vouchers are secondary. Hungary and Estonia 
score 4, Bulgaria 3 Czeck republic, Latvia, Romania, Russia and Slovenia score 2 and Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia 
and Ukraine 1. 
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• Index of the extent to which privatisation is geared towards foreign 
investors. 
 
  2.2.2 Financial Infrastructure 
Progress in establishing financial infrastructure and capital markets is important for 
foreign investors because it facilitates access to local capital markets. The better-
developed markets encourage business to set up operations, as they can access 
complementary local finance more easily, and face lower TCs for local financial services 
such as the payment system. Moreover their customers too are more likely to have 
access to bank credit, which should accelerate the demand for, e.g., industrial machinery 
and up-market consumer goods that often are bought on credit. 
 
However, the effect of capital market development on FDI is not necessarily 
unidirectional. Foreign investors may substitute locally raised capital for capital raised on 
international capital markets, which would lead to a reduction of recorded FDI inflow 
(loans from parent are included in the OECD statistics as FDI capital). Nonetheless, the 
received consensus is that the former effect dominates over the latter so we propose: 
 
Proposition 2b: “The development of the financial markets infrastructure increases FDI 
inflows” 
 
We use the following proxies for the financial market infrastructure, which are derived 
from the EBRD Transition Report (1999): 
 
• EBRD index of non-banking financial institutions reform  
• EBRD index of banking sector reform.  
 
  2.2.3 Establishing Markets 
The essence of transforming a centrally planned economy to a market economy is the 
establishment of markets as basic institution for exchange of goods and services. 
Progress in establishing market institutions increases business opportunities while 
reducing institutional uncertainty. The most crucial step of creating markets is 
liberalisation of prices in both domestic and international markets. 
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Beyond this, regulatory institutions are required, such as competition policy. While 
liberalisation has been rapid throughout the region, the process of designing and 
implementing competition policy has been far more complex (Hare et al., 1999). 
Governments in the less reformed countries continue to protect markets of their local 
firms, even at sub-national level. Dutz and Vagliasindi (2000) find sharp differences in 
both rules and implementation across the region’s countries and time, though only 
successful implementation has a strong positive relationship with economy-wide intensity 
of competition, whereas the mere existence of rules do not.  
 
Studies in developing countries suggest that openness of the economy and liberal trade 
regimes are positively associated with investment and growth (Jun and Singh, 1996; 
Balasubramanian et al., 1997; Edwards, 1997). However, as openness is usually proxied 
by trade intensity the causality may well be reversed, as FDI contributes to a country’s 
imports and exports. Our indicators are based on experts’ assessment and thus less 
likely to suffer from such bias. On competition policy, however, we have to note that 
some MNEs are quietly taking advantage of weak competition policy and command 
considerable market power in small emerging markets. Thus, a counter-effect is 
possible.  
 
We thus suggest two propositions on the establishment of markets:  
 
Proposition 2c:  “Liberalisation of domestic and international markets increases FDI 
inflows”. 
Proposition 2d:  “Development of regulation and competition policy increases FDI 
inflows”. 
 
We use the following indices of liberalisation:  
 
• EBRD index of price liberalisation 
• EBRD index of foreign exchange and trade liberalisation 
 
and for regulation and competition policy:  
 
• EBRD index of competition policy  
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All three items are derived from the EBRD Transition Report (1999). 
 
  2.2.4 Legal Infrastructure and Corruption 
An efficient legal infrastructure reduces institutional uncertainties for foreign investors, 
facilitates establishment and enforcement of contracts and in various other ways reduces 
the TCs of doing business in an economy. Prior research has focused in particular on 
the impact of intellectual property rights protection on FDI, given the political sensitivity of 
this particular issue. Oxley (1999) and Smarzynska (1999) found that weak property 
rights inhibit FDI inflows.3 However, in the transition economies, not only intellectual 
property rights are of concern, so we require a broader index of the legal framework. 
 
As noted above, transition scholars have highlighted that by the late 1990s many 
elements of a market-based legal framework had been established, but the 
implementation of laws was often weak (Murrell, 1996; World Bank, 1996; EBRD, 1999). 
This is attributed, among other reasons, to the fact that it takes time to establish the 
informal institutions that need to underpin the law: trained lawyers, independent judges, 
and general knowledge about laws and legal proceedings. Therefore, we need to 
distinguish the extensiveness and effectiveness of legal reform. We expect legal 
effectiveness to have a more powerful effect than legal extensiveness, because this is 
what impacts directly on business operations. 
 
Proposition 2e:  “Progress in legal extensiveness and in legal effectiveness 
encourage FDI, with the impact of legal effectiveness being 
stronger”. 
 
We utilise two indicators from the EBRD Transition Report (1999): 
 
• EBRD index of legal effectiveness 
• EBRD index of legal extensiveness 
 
                                                 
3 Data on intellectual property rights protection are not available in satisfactory quality for the countries of our study. 
Ostergard (2000) reviews available data but includes obtained data for only five of our host countries (his data are on: 
http://www.binghamton.edu/polsci/research/jibsdata.html). Smarzynska (1999) uses a three-point scale based on her 
own assessment.  
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In prior research, Garibaldi et al. (1999) included an aggregate of these two indices in 
their analysis, and reported the variable to be positive but not significant. 
 
3. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND LOCATIONAL ADVANTAGES 
 
The OLI paradigm proposes that FDI occurs if O-advantages held by a firm in one 
country can be profitably combined with L-advantages of another country (and 
internalisation incentives favour internal co-ordination over market co-ordination). FDI 
between nations hence ought to be a function of both L-advantages in the host country, 
and the specific complementarities between resources held in the two countries.  
 
 3.1 Labour Cost 
The cost of labour is an important locational advantage of any potential host economy, 
particularly for firms seeking to locate manufacturing to apply worldwide markets. Given 
the labour cost differences, FDI was expected to utilise factor cost differences and to 
build export oriented production in CEE. The region still has low labour costs compared 
with western Europe although higher than some locations in southeast Asia. Relocation 
of production to regions with lower labour costs has been reported as an important 
motive of FDI in CEE (Estrin, Hughes and Todd, 1997). The opportunity arises from the 
simultaneous industrial restructuring in western and eastern Europe, which creates high 
wage differences within Europe. In this environment, manufacturing businesses 
experience simultaneously a cost push in the west and a cost pull in the east (Ozawa, 
1992; Meyer, 2000b).  
 
Although many projects are motivated by market-seeking motives (OECD, 1995; Meyer, 
1998; Pye, 1998), there is a considerable number of investments in local production 
aimed at global markets. Since these projects typically require more capital transfer than 
pure sales operations they weigh heavily in the FDI capital flows. Hence we expect that 
low labour costs are crucial for attracting FDI. However, the variable has to be specified 
carefully to distinguish between a number of different factors. Multinational firms will not 
wish to invest abroad, even if wage costs are modest, if the productivity levels attained in 
their foreign plants is very low. Any lowering in the standards of labour efficiency relative 
to western operations must therefore be more than matched by savings in wage costs. 
Thus we focus in our empirical work on the differential in unit labour costs between 
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source and host economies. Moreover, in order to take out any exchange rate effects, 
the labour cost differential is calculated in DM. 
 
Proposition 3a: “Large differences in relative wage levels increase the potential for 
production relocation and thus increase FDI” 
 
We utilise data obtained from EBRD on average monthly earnings and productivity in 
manufacturing (in DM) for our host countries4. Data for our source countries was derived 
from the International Labour Office Yearbook of Labour Statistics (ILO, 1999). The 
relative unit labour cost (RULC) was then computed as the difference between the 
source to host country value. 
 
Prior research has used rather simplistic proxies for labour costs as FDI determinants, 
without taking account of the difference between source and host country, and the 
results are inconclusive. Barrel and Pain (1997, 1999) find an FDI-reducing effect while 
Wei (2000) finds an FDI-increasing effect. For transition economies, Lansbury et al. 
(1996) find a negative effect of unit labour costs on FDI in Visegrad countries, which 
however is insignificant in all but one of the equations, while Holland and Pain (1998) 
find a significant negative impact of wage levels in the host countries, whether they 
controlled for productivity levels or not. 
 
 3.2 Distance 
The cultural and linguistic distance between home and host country affects costs of 
internal organisation and economic risk via the availability of information on the local 
environment and personal interaction between local and foreign individuals. In particular 
the international business literature has used the concept of distance, sometimes going 
beyond geography to include cultural factors: ‘psychic distance’. Psychic distance 
includes geographical as well as cultural, political and linguistic commonalties between 
the home and the host economy. Traditional business ties also reduce unfamiliarity and 
thus increase present FDI. The internationalisation process model (Johansen and 
Vahlne, 1977) proposes that firms enter markets in a sequence starting in countries in 
close ‘psychic distance’. This has been found to negatively influence the performance or 
survival rate of local ventures (Barkema et al., 1996; Li and Guisinger, 1993; Meschi, 
                                                 
4 We are indebted to Simon Commander for his assistance in helping us to obtain this data. 
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1997). The relative importance of psychic distance appears to have declined since the 
1970s, as economic conditions are becoming more important (Sölvell, 1987; Nordström, 
1991). However, the model is still highly relevant to explain international business activity 
by small and medium size firms, who are relatively important in this region. Hence, we 
expect that distance increases the costs of business and thus discourages FDI.5 
 
Prior research has generally found that distance — geographical as well as psychic — 
reduces FDI. For instance, Martin and Velasquez (1997) find a significantly negative 
effect of distance on FDI in the OECD countries and a positive significant effect if the 
host and source countries share a common border. This is an important variable in the 
context of central and eastern Europe, a region where borders have changed 
enormously over the past century reflecting the closely intertwined history and culture of 
the region. For this reason, we also include a dummy variable taking the value unity if a 
pair of countries share a common border. Wei (2000) also finds a negative effect of 
distance and a positive effect of linguistic tie, i.e. whether or not the two countries share 
a common language. 
 
This leads to the propositions:  
 
Proposition 3b  “Increased distance reduces FDI”. 
Proposition 3c  “Sharing a common border increases FDI”. 
 
 3.3 Macroeconomy 
Further control variables are necessary to control for the size of the respective home and 
host economies. The former variable reflects the economic power of the source country 
to generate multinational firms and outward FDI, the later the attraction of the host 
country as a market and as a location for complementary resources. Surveys (Meyer, 
1998) indicate that multinational search for new markets has been a major motive for FDI 
                                                 
5 International business researchers frequently use the index developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) on the basis of 
Hofstede's work on culture. We believe that this index is not appropriate for the current host countries because the 
relevant aspects of culture that distinguish East European and capitalist economies are insufficiently reflected in the 
scales developed by Hofstede. Moreover, cultures are not constant, what is very visible in the transition economies 
(Feichtinger and Fink, 1998). Dated data on culture are thus of limited value here. We therefore abstain from 
employing Hofstede type measures, even though there are ‘estimates’ (of unknown quality) available for some 
transition economies. Hofstede's original work did not cover any central-plan economy (the only ‘socialist’ country in 
the study is Yugoslavia). Recently, scholars started constructing similar indices based on the work by Trompenaars 
(Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997). These are available for six CEE countries, which does not suffice for this 
study. 
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into transition economies. We include GDP for both countries in current prices and 
measured in million DM, derived from the International Financial Statistics Yearbook 
(IMF, 1999). Such variables have been frequently significant in prior research, and are 
commonly included in studies on CEE (Martin and Velasquez, 1997; Resmini, 2000; 
Brenton et al., 1999). This leads to the propositions: 
 
Proposition 3d  “Increased source country income increases the ability to engage 
in FDI”. 
Proposition 3e   “Increased host country market size increases FDI”. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Cross-sectional empirical analysis of FDI has frequently been applied to analyse 
aggregate FDI capital flows. It has been applied to transition economies by, among 
others, Lansbury et al. (1996) and Holland and Pain (1998). Several studies employed 
country-to-country level data, mostly in order to estimate gravity model type equations 
(Brainard, 1997; Eaton and Tamura, 1996). This approach has been applied to east-west 
European FDI flows by Boros and Erkillä (1995), Martin and Velasquez (1997), Brenton, 
Di Mauro and Lücke (1998) and Resmini (2000), who, however, use mainly country level 
data with limited consideration of specific bilateral aspects of the relationship between 
host and home countries. 
 
Our analysis is based upon a large dataset covering the period 1994 to 1998, containing 
information on FDI flows and the source and host country characteristics referred to 
above. Each observation point in our dataset constitutes a relation between source 
country i (EU-14, as Belgium and Luxembourg are merged, Korea, Japan, Switzerland 
and the USA) and host country j (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine). Hence 
each observation details the flow of FDI from i to j — for example, from Austria to the 
Czech Republic — in million DM. FDI data is derived from various issues of the 
International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook published by the OECD. 6 
                                                 
6 This data confirms to the standard definition of FDI as ‘an investment involving a long-term relationship and 
reflecting a lasting  interest and control of a resident entity in one economy…. in an enterprise resident in an 
economy other than that of the foreign direct investor’(United Nations, 1999). Hence the FDI data used has three 
components: equity capital; reinvested earnings, and intra-company loans or debt transactions. Consequently it 
excludes portfolio investments and other capital account movements. 
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The independent variables pertaining to the source and recipient countries are listed in 
table A1 in the appendix. We distinguish between variables which relate only to either 
the host or home country (i or j variables), and those which reflect a differential between 
the home and host country (ij variables). Each variable is constructed as the arithmetic 
average value over the five year period of our sample. Averaging in this way enables us 
to overcome the problems of estimating annual cross-sectional regressions on FDI data 
that tends to be ‘lumpy’ in nature: investment projects typically have a life-span of more 
than one period, and hence the initial inflow that occurs when a project is undertaken is 
effectively a stock rather than flow variable. Hence estimations which use country 
characteristics to explain FDI inflow on the basis of one data period may be biased 
through including the initial large set-up flow while failing to control for the longer term 
implications of the investment. 7  
 
In order to assess the implications of general transition performance for FDI inflows, we 
firstly estimate a base model with control variables and determining factors including an 
aggregate transition index. Because Russia is something of a special case among 
transition economies, with high proportion of its GDP and a majority of its trade deriving 
from raw materials and energy, we felt it was desirable to include a specific control 
variable — the Russia dummy variable. Hence we estimate an equation of the following 
form: 8 
 
 ( )jjijijijjiij RussiaIndexTransitionBorderCommonGDPGDPFDI ,,,RULC,Distance,,=   (1) 
 
We present the results of these estimations in the following sub-section. Having 
established a baseline model, sub-section 4.2 then replaces the aggregate transition 
index with individual institutional elements of transition, in order to examine their impact 
upon FDI flows in a more detailed manner.  
 
                                                 
7 This is particularly problematic in small countries (e.g. the Baltic States) and/or countries which do not receive a 
great deal of FDI, as one large project may account for a large proportion of total FDI receipts in any one period.  
8 In order to estimate market size effects directly we have chosen not to deflate our dependent variable by host GDP. 
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 4.1 FDI Flows and Progress in Transition  
We regress the level of FDI flow from each source country i to each recipient country j 
against our various source and recipient country characteristic variables, and our 
aggregate transition index and present the results in table 1 below, as model 1.9 
 
Overall, the regression is highly significant; hence we reject the null hypothesis of joint 
insignificance of the coefficients at the 1 per cent level. Moreover, all the independent 
variables are statistically significant with the predicted sign. Thus we confirm the full set 
of hypothesis outlined in section 3 above. Commencing with the control variables, our 
model establishes that FDI is lower between countries located geographically more 
distant from one another, and higher in ones that share a common border (Proposition 
3b,c). We also find that firms from large economies invest abroad significantly more than 
those from smaller ones. The economies of scope and scale that derives from a larger 
domestic market thus appear to offer advantages that can be replicated abroad 
(Proposition 3d). It is also striking that FDI is attracted to larger markets, with the 
coefficient on the host GDP being large, positive and significant at the 99 per cent level 
(Proposition 3e). 
 
Though our equation confirms the empirical relevance of market motives for FDI into 
transition economies, it also provides the first unambiguous evidence in the transition 
context for the relevance of relative labour costs. As predicted in Proposition 3a, FDI is 
significantly higher between countries where the relative unit labour cost advantages of 
relocation are greater. The contrast between this clear finding and those of the previous 
studies probably arises because the data cover a period and controls for exchange rates 
and productivity are included. In the early turbulent years of longer transition, the relative 
cost advantages of producing in central and eastern Europe may have been outweighed 
in the minds of many western businessmen by the problem of low productivity, exchange 
rates and unstable political environments. Our equation suggests that once these latter 
factors are controlled for properly, the impact of relative unit labour costs on FDI 
emerges clearly by 1998. 
 
We included the Russia dummy because of the suspicion that, as the only major natural 
resource supplier in the region, the factors driving FDI to that country might differ from 
                                                 
9 In each case White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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these in Central and Eastern Europe. Model 1 confirms this to be the case, but not 
exactly in the way that we might have expected. The coefficient is highly significant and 
negative, indicating that Russia receives less FDI than would be expected given all the 
other factors controlled for in the regression. Russian under-performance in FDI, given 
its market size, is thus deeper than can be explained by its relatively poor performance in 
the process of transition. 
 
The most important result in model 1 however concerns the impact of institutions on 
business strategies. We have established that, even after traditional factors determining 
FDI such as market size and labour costs are taken into account, the creation of 
institutions for a market economy acts to increase FDI flows (Proposition 1). This 
supports the view that progress in transition, as measured by the EBRD index, acts to 
improve the business climate for foreign investment, by reducing transaction costs and 
risks of international business operations. In the following section we go on to explore 
the particular institutional factors conducive to the enhancement of FDI in transition 
economies. 
 
 4.2 FDI Flows and Institutional Progress 
We explore the empirical impact of four institutional developments which have been at 
the forefront of consideration during the transition progress: privatisation; financial sector 
reform; liberalisation and the establishment of market institutions; legal development. 
The resulting estimations are presented in tables 2 to 5, and we discuss the findings 
relating to each institutional factor in turn in the following sub-sections. The coefficients of 
the basic model are extremely robust to these specification changes. In none of the 
equations reported do these results contradict those of the previous section — coefficients 
that were previously significant remain so and do not change sign. Indeed the collinearity 
between the variables of the basic model and the institutional parameters must be very 
small, because the coefficients on the former hardly change value. Hence we focus our 
discussion upon the added institutional variables. 
 
  4.2.1 Privatisation 
Table 2 presents the results of our examination of the impact of privatisation and 
enterprise reform upon FDI receipts, presented as models 2 to 5. Models 2 and 3 
illustrate that both small and large-scale privatisation have a positive impact upon FDI 
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receipts and support proposition 2a. Model 4 establishes that FDI receipts are 
significantly positively associated with the share of GDP produced by the private sector. 
This result is stronger than when the privatisation indices are used perhaps because the 
variable includes the activities of some de novo enterprises which have been seen to be 
extremely significant during transition. Consequently we interpret our results as 
illustrating that both privatisation and private sector development more generally serve to 
encourage FDI.  
 
The method of privatisation included under model 5, however, does not have significant 
implications for FDI. Hence, we are unable to confirm the positive finding of Holland and 
Pain (1998). This suggests that countries that do not sell enterprises directly to foreign 
investors receive an equal amount of FDI in other forms, i.e. via greenfield investment or 
via acquisition of already private firms. This confirms case study findings about investors’ 
intentions and motives (Estrin, Hughes and Todd, 1997). 
 
  4.2.2 Financial Sector Development 
Table 3 presents the results of estimations with our chosen financial sector reform 
variables. We find clear evidence that banking sector reform is associated with greater 
FDI inflows under model 6 (Proposition 2b). Hence our results suggest that foreign 
investors are concerned with the effectiveness of the banking sector to serve as a robust 
payment system and source of non-equity finance. Moreover the result may reflect the 
thought that the possibility of banking crises reduces FDI owing to the negative 
implications which such an event may have for customers and suppliers of a venture. By 
contrast non-bank reform seems to be of little importance for foreign investors under 
model 7. This suggests that the development of other financial institutions such as 
securities markets, investment funds and private pension funds are of secondary or no 
importance to foreign investors. One interpretation is that foreign investors interact more 
directly with local banks than with other local financial institutions.  
 
  4.2.3 Market Institutions 
Under models 8 and 9 in table 4 we find partial evidence that the liberalisation of 
domestic and international markets has a positive and significant effect on FDI inflow. 
Interestingly we cannot confirm that progress in domestic price liberalisation has a 
significant implication for FDI inflows, though the coefficient has the predicted positive 
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sign. However model 9 finds a highly significant positive effect of foreign exchange and 
trade liberalisation, which provides support for one element of Proposition 2c.  
 
We find in model 10 that the development of competition policy does not have a 
significant impact on FDI receipts, and we are forced to reject proposition 2d. These 
results are very interesting because they suggest that the building of institutions to 
develop flexibility and competition in domestic markets is not a significant factor in 
influencing foreign investment decisions, though a liberal foreign exchange regime is 
important. It may simply be that foreign investors prefer to invest in monopolistic 
markets.10 The attraction of investing in economies with developed domestic market 
institutions may be offset by the desire to invest in highly protected or regulated markets 
in view of the market power they are able to obtain. With weak competition policy, FDI is 
more able to extract monopoly rents. However this may lead to lower allocative efficiency 
(whoever appropriates the rents: multinational firms, their local partners, or the 
regulators). Competition policy may thus be primarily an instrument to manage the 
spillovers from FDI to the host economy, rather than to encourage FDI per se.  
 
  4.2.4 Legal Infrastructure and Corruption 
Table 5 presents the results of our estimations with our legal indicators. The results of 
models 11 and 12 indicate that the development of the legal system has a strong effect 
on FDI inflow, both if measured in terms of the extensiveness of the legal framework 
(model 11) and its effective implementation (model 12). When both variables are 
included simultaneously in model 13, however, we find evidence to suggest that legal 
extensiveness dominates effectiveness which is contrary to our prior expectations. 
Hence under this specification we are unable to fully accept proposition 2e.  
 
It is notable however, that our Russia dummy variable, while negative and significant 
under model 11, loses value when combined with legal effectiveness in model 12. This 
suggests that low legal effectiveness has a part to play in the poor FDI performance of 
Russia. This suggestion is confirmed when we exclude the Russian dummy and hence 
do not control directly for Russia, under model 14. Comparison of models 13 and 14 
                                                 
10 We are grateful to Mike Peng for pointing out to us that this competition result is supported by a case study of the 
Chinese photographic industry: a major western photographic company acquired several Chinese companies and 
lobbied the Chinese government to prevent any other foreign entrants in the sector for a four year period following 
the acquisitions.  
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indicate that when Russia is controlled for, legal extensiveness appears to dominate 
effectiveness, however both variables become positive and significant once the control is 
removed. This result therefore illustrates the implications of the gap that exists between 
legal extensiveness and effectiveness in Russia.11 Indeed when Russia was excluded 
from our sample in supplementary tests, we found extensiveness to dominate 
effectiveness in the same manner as model 12, confirming this hypothesis and 
suggesting that lack of legal effectiveness may be the cause of the low FDI in Russia. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this paper we have analysed the determinants of international direct investment flows 
and focused on two aspects that were given insufficient attention in prior research: 
labour cost and the institutional framework.  
 
We have established that the size of the host markets and the financing ability of the 
source country have a significant positive impact upon FDI flows. Moreover, we confirm 
the results of previous analyses that distance negatively impacts on FDI flows because 
distance increases the costs of doing business, and that sharing common borders has a 
positive effect. Relative unit labour costs are found to be an important determinant of FDI 
flows to transition economies.  
 
General progress in transition is found significantly to increase FDI flows. Moreover, 
when we dis-aggregate the overall transition index to subsets of institutional 
development, we are able to distinguish the particular institution developments that 
attract FDI. Our findings suggest that the following measures are likely to enhance FDI 
receipts to our sample of transition economies: 
 
• Privatisation and the creation of a functioning private sector more generally; 
• Development of the banking sector; 
• Liberalisation of foreign exchange and trade; but not necessarily domestic prices. 
• Development of legal institutions; 
 
                                                 
11 The values for Russia are legal extensiveness 4, legal effectiveness 2+. No other country has a similarly large gap 
between these two indicators. 
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By contrast we found that non-banking financial sector development does not appear to 
have a significant impact upon FDI. Furthermore, we found that development of 
competition policy does not appear to be significant in motivating FDI. This perhaps 
reflects the fact that some foreign investors are attracted by the possibility of earning 
monopoly rents. 
 
Our results also suggested that Russia is in an extremely interesting position with regard 
to FDI. Russia suffers, according to EBRD indices, from poor legal effectiveness. The 
fundamental issue here is not writing legislation, but of legislative enforcement. The lack 
of enforcement may be the key obstacle to acceleration of FDI in Russia. 
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Table 1: Aggregate Progress in Economic Transition and FDI (robust standard 
errors in parentheses) 
 
 
 Model 1 
 FDI 
  
  
Transition Index 52.20959* 
(30.95218) 
 
Source GDP 0.02450*** 
(0.00594) 
 
Host GDP 1.17836*** 
(0.33789) 
 
Distance -0.03649*** 
(0.01146) 
 
Relative Unit 
Labour Cost 
68.68627*** 
(26.33289) 
 
Common Border 307.3232** 
(155.5996) 
 
Russia -379.6899** 
(161.0802) 
 
Constant -167.5698** 
(84.53246) 
  
No. of Obs 158 
F-value 5.01 
R2 0.3941 
  
***, ** and *, significant at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent level respectively;  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table 2: Privatisation, Enterprise Reform and FDI (robust standard errors in 
parentheses) 
 
 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 FDI FDI FDI FDI 
     
     
Source GDP 0.02466*** 
(0.00608) 
0.0245*** 
(0.00599) 
0.02414*** 
(0.00594) 
0.02554*** 
(0.00617) 
 
Host GDP 1.26422*** 
(0.32416) 
1.26733*** 
(0.32703) 
1.24623*** 
(0.32670) 
1.45333*** 
(0.34367) 
 
Distance -0.03685*** 
(0.01187) 
-0.03664*** 
(0.01167) 
-0.03565*** 
(0.01174) 
-0.03936*** 
(0.01241) 
 
Relative Unit 
Labour Cost 
71.83382** 
(28.06061) 
66.58475*** 
(25.65273) 
62.87117** 
(25.69717) 
76.38704*** 
(28.32616) 
 
Common Border 311.9852** 
(154.2312) 
305.9291** 
(154.7899) 
310.3921** 
(152.8225) 
314.7506** 
(152.3826) 
 
Russia -438.5573*** 
(153.4398) 
-439.0038*** 
(154.6528) 
-429.5544*** 
(154.6716) 
-512.6157*** 
(161.2696) 
 
Constant -91.13421** 
(43.7643) 
-108.9364** 
(45.66824) 
-165.1715*** 
(59.8886) 
-65.45919* 
(34.59712) 
 
Small-Scale 
Privatisation  
21.77027* 
(13.10366) 
 
   
Large-Scale 
Privatisation 
 33.12967* 
(17.61119) 
 
  
Private Sector 
Share in GDP  
  2.67448** 
(1.13561) 
 
 
Privatisation 
Method 
   22.19657 
(14.55581) 
     
No. of Obs 158 158 158 158 
F-value 5.13 5.33 5.34 4.84 
R2 0.3894 0.3960 0.3931 0.3991 
     
***, ** and *, significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively;  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table 3: Financial Sector Reform and FDI (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 
 Model 6 Model 7 
 FDI FDI 
   
   
Source GDP 0.02446*** 
(0.00592) 
0.02488*** 
(0.00601) 
 
Host GDP 1.24358*** 
(0.32176) 
1.18145*** 
(0.39292) 
 
Distance -0.03620*** 
(0.01142) 
-0.03773*** 
(0.01168) 
 
Relative Unit 
Labour Cost 
69.12496** 
(27.05236) 
73.34912*** 
(26.7246) 
 
Common Border 310.2681** 
(154.472) 
309.9339* 
(157.2098) 
 
Russia -390.3199** 
(153.1932) 
-401.955** 
(178.7779) 
 
Constant -150.8465** 
(63.80066) 
-70.97872 
(70.00579) 
 
Bank Reform 50.8449** 
(25.34613) 
 
 
 
Non-Bank 
Reform 
 26.45974 
(35.06161) 
   
No. of Obs 158 158 
F-value 4.89 4.83 
R2 0.3959 0.3884 
   
***, ** and *, significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
respectively;  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table 4: Market Institutions and FDI (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
 FDI FDI FDI 
    
    
Source GDP 0.02446*** 
(0.00589) 
0.02472*** 
(0.00608) 
0.02473*** 
(0.00604) 
 
Host GDP 1.19443*** 
(0.32789) 
1.27922*** 
(0.32061) 
1.19281*** 
(0.33742) 
 
Distance -0.03638*** 
(0.01142) 
-0.03698*** 
(0.01188) 
-0.03714*** 
(0.01177) 
 
Relative Unit 
Labour Cost 
69.31162** 
(27.07391) 
73.01143*** 
(27.96252) 
71.03865*** 
(26.85747) 
 
Common Border 312.6831** 
(154.7203) 
310.8525** 
(153.322) 
311.0257** 
(154.0134) 
 
Russia -400.205** 
(155.2054) 
-418.352*** 
(150.7623) 
-399.2605** 
(159.0928) 
 
Constant -648.4195* 
(386.791) 
-163.4198*** 
(51.28257) 
-79.9206* 
(42.24412) 
 
Price 
Liberalisation 
215.8771 
(133.6432) 
 
  
Forex and Trade 
Liberalisation 
 39.07755*** 
(13.51787) 
 
 
Competition 
Policy 
  30.63767 
(20.89418) 
    
No. of Obs 158 158 158 
F-value 4.81 5.30 4.86 
R2 0.3939 0.3928 0.3910 
    
***, ** and *, significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively;  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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5: Legal Reform and FDI (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
 FDI FDI FDI FDI 
     
     
Source GDP 0.02419*** 
(0.00588) 
0.02519*** 
(0.00611) 
0.02420*** 
(0.00598) 
0.02384*** 
(0.00615) 
 
Host GDP 1.12676*** 
(0.31632) 
1.12242*** 
(0.32226) 
1.12441*** 
(0.32388) 
0.41718*** 
(0.12836) 
 
Distance -0.03537*** 
(0.01165) 
-0.03836*** 
(0.01203) 
-0.03541*** 
(0.01196) 
-0.03634*** 
(0.01239) 
 
Relative Unit Labour 
Cost 
65.20709** 
(26.67228) 
73.46961*** 
(27.54375) 
65.28735** 
(27.13819) 
49.20247* 
(26.55095) 
 
Common Border 313.9118** 
(150.4116) 
310.9904** 
(151.644) 
313.7977** 
(151.1236) 
317.642* 
(163.1926) 
 
Russia -383.2193** 
(150.1858) 
-348.0326** 
(152.5397) 
-381.3394** 
(155.429) 
 
Constant -205.1469*** 
(48.20546) 
-126.9089*** 
(41.60562) 
-205.4065*** 
(49.71605) 
-244.9286*** 
(62.16172) 
 
Legal Extensiveness 59.03379*** 
(14.67597) 
 58.14673*** 
(15.66924) 
39.85106** 
(18.30668) 
 
Legal Effectiveness  37.44549*** 
(13.80597) 
1.02691 
(16.13716) 
43.42452** 
(21.43143) 
 
No. of Obs 158 158 158 158 
 
F-value 5.77 5.01 5.18 4.97 
 
R2 0.4102 0.3995 0.4102 0.3717 
 
***, ** and *, significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively;  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table A1: Data and Sources 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Variable Definition 
 
 
Data Source 
 
   
i or j variables 
   
Source GDP Source Country GDP in current prices (DM mn) IMF International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook (1999) 
 
Host GDP Host GDP in current prices (DM mn) IMF International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook (1999) 
 
Transition Index Transition Index Calculated from EBRD Transition 
Report (various) 
 
Russia Russia dummy  
 
Small- Scale 
Privatisation 
Small scale privatisation index EBRD Transition Report (1999) 
 
 
Large-Scale 
Privatisation 
Large scale privatisation index EBRD Transition Report (1999) 
 
 
Privatisation Method Host privatisation method (1 to 4 dummy) Holland and Pain (1998) and EBRD 
Transition report (1999) 
 
Private Sector Share 
in GDP (%) 
Host private sector share of GDP EBRD Transition report (1999) 
 
 
Bank Reform Index of banking sector reform EBRD Transition Report (1999) 
 
Non-Bank Reform Index of Non-Banking Financial Institutions Reform EBRD Transition Report (1999) 
 
Price Liberalisation Index of Price Liberalisation EBRD Transition Report (1999) 
 
Forex and Trade 
Liberalisation 
Index of forex and trade liberalisation EBRD Transition Report (1999) 
 
 
Competition Policy Index of competition policy EBRD Transition Report (1999) 
 
Legal Extensiveness Index of Legal Extensiveness EBRD Transition Report (1999) 
 
Legal Effectiveness Index of Legal Effectiveness EBRD Transition Report (1999) 
 
   
 ij variables  
   
Common Border Common borders dummy  
 
Distance  Distance between capital cities of host and donor 
(Kilometres) 
How Far Is It? Website 
 
 
Relative unit labour 
cost 
Relative wage between source and host countries 
(average monthly earnings in manufacturing) (annual 
average, D-Mark), divided by average labour 
productivity. 
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